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Abstract
In this paper, we assess the impact of competition, investment and regulation on prices
of mobile services in France. We estimate hedonic price regressions using data on tariff plans
offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in France between May 2011 and
December 2014. In this time period, the obtained quality-adjusted price index decreased by
about 42.8% as compared to a decline in weighted average prices without quality-adjustment
of 8.7%. In a second step, we relate the quality-adjusted prices to a set of competition, invest-
ment and regulation variables and find that the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators
was the main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment. Low-cost tariffs
without commitment which were introduced to pre-empt the entry of low-cost competitor
declined at the time of entry. Moreover, we find that regulation, which is approximated by
the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and
data, has a joint significant impact on quality-adjusted prices. In percentage terms, compe-
tition is responsible for about 23.4% of total price decline and investments in 4G for 56.1%.
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We conclude that the reduction in quality-adjusted prices in the last years was largely caused
by competition between operators for a new 4G technology and by entry of fourth low-cost
operator.
Key Words: Mobile telecommunications; hedonic price regression; regulation; investments;
entry
JEL Classification: L13, L50, L96
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1 Introduction
The competitiveness of mobile telecommunications industry is commonly assessed by the in-
dustry regulators on the basis of price comparisons over time and across countries.1 But such
comparisons are not easy for industries which exhibit dynamic changes in both price and qual-
ity of products. Pricing of mobile telecommunications services has remained complex since the
launch of mobile technology in 1990s. Initially, mobile operators charged different prices for calls
to mobile and fixed-line numbers as well as calls made peak and off-peak, on- and off-net with
different billing intervals per second, per 10 seconds, per minute, which also could differ for the
first and subsequent minutes of the call. Apart from that, the price of calls differed depending
on tariff and monthly subscription fee, length of contract and handset subsidy. Over time, much
simpler pre-paid tariffs were introduced without commitment and tariffs with included minutes
allowances. But operators also started to complicate tariffs by introducing special prices for
selected numbers, family offers, etc. In addition, new services were introduced which were ei-
ther substitutes or complements to voice calls, including SMS, MMS, voice mail, roaming, etc.
The next pricing revolution came with the development of 4G networks and increasing demand
for mobile Internet access. Mobile operators now typically offer unlimited voice calls and data
allowances which makes them more transparent to consumers than before. Still, a wide range
of tariffs are offered on monthly basis which are replaced by new ones in the next months.
The pricing strategies of mobile operators, and continuous changes in the range of offered
services, make it very difficult to follow the evolution of prices in the recent years. At the same
time, it is very important to understand price changes in mobile telecommunications because
they represent a significant share in monthly expenditure of every household and are typically
included in the ‘basket’ of products and services used to calculate inflation.2 Moreover, prices
of mobile services are closely watched by industry regulators because they can be influenced by
regulation of termination charges and roaming. Also, an ongoing convergence of fixed-line and
1See for example the reports published by the OECD, European Commission and national regulators.
2In France, the consumer price index (CPI) for the first time took into account a price index for mobile services
in January 2004. The index was calculated using the customer profile method, which was recognized as the best
approach by statisticians dealing with price indices. However, both data requirements and resources needed to
establish and maintain this approach are substantial. Aghion et al. (2017) demonstrate how challenges to measure
inflation when quality and variety of products change may understate estimates of economic growth.
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mobile technologies and increased popularity of bundled offers affect prices and draw attention
of the policy makers.3
Mobile prices were at the core of antitrust investigations including collusion and merger
cases. For instance, collusion in mobile telephony was detected and prosecuted in France in
2005. In the last years, several mergers took place between mobile operators, including mergers
which were cleared by the competition authorities such as the acquisition of tele.ring by T-
Mobile in Austria in 2006, a merger between T-Mobile and Orange in the Netherlands in 2007,
a merger between T-Mobile and Orange in the UK in 2010 and a merger between O2 and E-
Plus in Germany in 20144. Other mergers were blocked by the competition authorities, for
instance the recently proposed transaction between Three and O2 in the UK. The post-merger
prices of mobile services were the main concern in deciding on these transactions. Apart from
mergers, also when deciding about the number of new spectrum licences the regulators take
into account their impact on retail prices. Even though the numbers of mobile competitors was
largely decided in the 1990s during spectrum auctions for 2G and 3G technologies, the more
recent 4G auctions brought changes to the market structure. It is therefore interesting to know
whether entry and launch of new technology increase competition and results in lower prices.
In this paper, we estimate hedonic price regressions using a complete database of tariff
plans offered by the leading mobile telecommunications operator in France, Orange, on monthly
basis between May 2011 and December 2014.5 We divide the tariff plans into two groups:
classic contract tariffs with commitment, and low-cost contract tariffs without commitment and
without handset subsidy. In the latter case, consumers do not have to commit to stay with
the operator for 12 or 24 months and can quit the contract at any time. Low-cost tariffs were
introduced by Orange in October 2011 before the entry of fourth mobile operator, Free Mobile.
We regress the cost of tariffs on a set of characteristics including monthly dummy variables,
3According to a report by Analysys Mason, about 42% of fixed broadband households in France bundled
mobile voice contracts with their fixed broadband service at the end of 2012, which based on their forecasts
should increase to 75% by the end of 2017.
4See for example, Aguzzoni et al. (2015) for an ex-post analysis of two mobile telecom mergers in Austria and
the Netherlands
5Orange, formerly France Telecom, is the incumbent fixed-line operator in France. Orange is also market
leader in mobile market and its pricing strategies are representative for the whole market. It was followed by the
competitors in the decisions to launch low-cost tariffs and 4G services. According to data from Analysys Mason
Telecom Market Matrix, the market share of Orange in mobile market was 39% as of Q3 2016.
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and derive a quality-adjusted price index. In this time period, the quality-adjusted price index
decreased by about 42.8% as compared to a decline in average prices without quality-adjustment
of 8.7%. Next, we regress the quality-adjusted prices on a set of competition, investment and
regulation variables and find that the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators was the main
driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment. At the same time, low-cost tariffs
without commitment were introduced to pre-empt entry of low-cost competitor Free Mobile and
declined at the time of their entry. Moreover, we find that regulation, which is approximated
by the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and
data, has a joint significant impact on quality-adjusted prices. In percentage terms, competition
is responsible for about 23.4% of total price decline, launch of 4G technology for 56.1%, with
the remaining effect being regulation and other factors. Thus, we conclude that the reduction
in quality-adjusted prices in the last years was largely caused by competition between operators
for a new 4G technology and by entry of fourth low-cost operator. We also compare the results
from our hedonic price regressions with alternative approaches which track price changes over
time based on consumer usage profiles, such as the OECD usage basket method. This approach
is commonly used to analyze the evolution of prices of telecommunications services. It also
indicates that entry, launch of low-cost brands and investments in 4G networks led to significant
price reductions. However, we consider that hedonic price regressions represent a more accurate
methodology to assess price changes of telecommunications markets and should be preferred by
the regulators.
Our study contributes to the literature on hedonic price regressions with an application to the
telecommunications industry. This is the first paper which relies on detailed tariff information for
a period of few years to quantify the impact of both entry and investments in new 4G technology
on quality-adjusted prices for mobile telecommunications services. The hedonic price model is
based on the idea that any product can be viewed as a bundle of attributes. Firms and consumers
trade with each other to determine the price attached to each attribute (see Griliches (1961)
and Rosen (1974) for a formal presentation of this model in perfectly competitive framework).
There are only a few empirical studies of prices indices for mobile telecommunications services.
For instance, Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) estimate hedonic price regression using monthly
5
tariff data from mobile operators in France in the period between June 1996 and December
2002. They find that quality-adjusted prices decreased in the earlier part of this period and
stabilized over time. There were also significant differences in quality-adjusted prices between
operators which diminished over time. Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) analyze changes in
quality-adjusted prices using data on 1,500 tariffs for DSL and Cable services in the U.S. in
years 2004-2009 based on a mixture of matched-model methods and consumer price indices.
Whilst they found only a modest decline in prices, they were nonetheless falling faster than
indicated by the price index for Internet access constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
In another paper, Wallsten and Riso (2014) estimate a linear hedonic model using data on over
25,000 broadband prices from OECD countries in years 2007-2009, while Calzada and Martinez-
Santos (2014) estimate price regressions using broadband tariffs data from 15 EU countries in
years 2008-2011. Finally, Coynes and Lyons (2015) estimate hedonic price regressions using
daily observations of plans offered in Ireland from 2007 to 2013. They find that average nominal
prices remain stable throughout the sample period but quality of service increased dramatically
over time, particularly with respect to download speed.6
Among studies on the impact of regulation on prices of telecommunications services, Genakos
and Valletti (2011) analyze how the regulatory intervention to cut fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termi-
nation rates impacts mobile retail prices. Using panel data of prices and profit margins for mobile
operators in more than 20 countries in a period of over six years, they find that a reduction
in F2M termination rates leads to an increase in retail prices,7 which they call the “waterbed”
effect.8 In a more recent paper by the same authors, Genakos and Valletti (2015) estimate
the impact of regulation of F2M termination rates on mobile phone bills using a large panel
covering 27 countries. They find that the “waterbed” phenomenon becomes insignificant on
average over the 10-year period, 2002-2011. They argue that this is due to the changing nature
6There is also a number of recent papers estimating hedonic price regressions in application to other industries
including wine. See for example Costanigro, Mittelhammer and McCluskey (2009), and Dimson, Rousseau and
Spaenjers (2015).
7They obtained information on retail prices from a consultancy firm Teligen, which collects telecommunications
pricing data. The prices are expressed in terms of three representative usage baskets (heavy, medium and low)
based on a number of characteristics (number of calls and messages, average call length, time and type of call,
etc.) which are then held fixed across countries and over time.
8The “waterbed” effect suggests that pressing down prices in one part of firms’ operations causes another set
of prices to rise.
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of the industry, whereby mobile-to-mobile traffic surpassed fixed-to-mobile traffic.9 Moreover,
among studies on the impact of competition on prices in telecommunications markets, Genakos
et al. (2015) analyze how entries and exits influence prices of mobile services and investments
in networks using cross-section panel data for 33 OECD countries in years 2002-2014. They
also approximate mobile prices using Teligen’s baskets and use the estimates to comment on
the effects of mergers on prices and investments. They find that mobile markets become more
concentrated in the analyzed period and prices increased, while the effect of concentration on
investment is not significant at the industry level.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main changes
in mobile telecommunications industry in France. Section 3 presents the data used in the
estimation. Section 4 introduces the econometric framework. Section 5 presents the estimation
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Mobile industry in France
This section describes the main events that took place in the mobile telecommunications industry
in France. The start of mobile telecommunications in France dates back to March 1992 when two
licences for digital mobile services GSM 900 were granted to the fixed-line incumbent operator
France Telecom Mobiles and Societe Francaise de Radiotelephonie (SFR). In June 1996, a third
network operator, Bouygues Telecom, entered the market after being granted a licence to operate
digital technology GSM 1800. In June 2001, the French government awarded two out of four
3G (UMTS) licences to France Telecom and SFR using a “beauty contest”, while Bouygues and
other players pulled out of the bidding due to the high licence price. In 2002, the authorities
altered the licence conditions and published a new call for two 3G licences, which were not
granted in the first round. The only bidder was Bouygues, which received the licence in October
2002. Between October 2002 and December 2009, there was no new entry into the market,
9A decade ago there was a burgeoning theoretical literature on the impact of mobile termination rates on
prices, which started with the seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998). For surveys, see
Armstrong (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (2000).
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except for a number of entries and exits of MVNOs.10 In December 2009, the French regulatory
authority (ARCEP) awarded a fourth 3G license to Free Mobile. Several months later, in March
2011, Free Mobile signed a national roaming agreement with Orange for the provision of 2G
and 3G services to increase its network coverage before launching mobile services. In September
2011, ARCEP awarded licences to operate 4G LTE networks to Orange, SFR, Bouygues and
Free Mobile.
In October 2011, three existing mobile operators, Orange, Bouygues Telecom and SFR,
launched offers under new brands called respectively Sosh, B&You and RED aiming to pre-
empt market entry of Free Mobile. These brands offered tariffs with no handset subsidy and
no commitment. After entry in January 2012, Free Mobile also launched two tariffs with no
handset subsidy and no commitment. About a year later, in November 2012, SFR pioneered
launch of 4G services which were initially available only in one city (Lyon). Orange on the other
hand, pioneered 4G business offers, which started in June 2012 in Marseille and expanded to
three other cities in November 2012. Residential 4G offers were launched by Orange in April
2013 in 11 cities. Bouygues Telecom had the best 4G coverage thanks to spectrum refarming
authorization on its 1800 Mhz band, which enabled the operator to have a coverage of 40%
of the French Metropolitan population when starting its 4G services.11 It commercialized its
4G services since May 2013, but the official launch took place in October 2013. At this time
Bouygues Telecom offered a 4G mobile plan for 15 Euros per month, which was considered to
be the best available 4G tariff on the market. Finally, Free Mobile launched its 4G services in
December 2013. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators
in France.
As discussed above, during the time period of our analysis, there were two major market
disruptions: entry of a fourth operator, Free Mobile, and commercial launch of 4G networks
by all four operators. We analyze how these events influenced prices of mobile services in
France. Moreover, we consider whether regulation of termination rates by ARCEP, and of
10AMobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) provides mobile services without having allocated own spectrum
and thus relying on network and spectrum of mobile network operators. MVNOs can apply own pricing strategies
and provide customer services.
11Spectrum refarming is reallocation of bands in the radio spectrum to gain more efficiency.
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Figure 1: Timeline of deployment of 4G services in France
Jan
2012
April
2012
Marseille (Orange B.)
July
2012
October
2012
Lyon (Orange B.)
Nantes (Orange B.)
Lille (Orange B.)
Lyon (SFR)
Montpellier (SFR)
La Défense (SFR)
Jan
2013
April
2013
11 cities (Orange)
Marseille (SFR)
Lille (SFR)
6 cities (Bouygues)
Toulouse (SFR)
July
2013
Strasbourg (SFR)
Paris (SFR)
Paris suburb (SFR)
Oct
2013
+ 4 cities (SFR)
+ 3 cities (SFR)
+ 10 cities (SFR)
Few cities (FREE)
Jan
2014
‘Orange B.’ denotes Orange Business offers. The bold text denotes the date of official launch of commercial 4G
services by each operator.
roaming charges by the European Commission, impacted quality-adjusted prices.12 The papers
by Genakos and Valletti (2011) and Genakos and Valletti (2015) mentioned above used fixed-to-
mobile (F2M) termination rates to explain changes in mobile retail prices. However, since at the
time of our analysis calls from fixed to mobile networks had declined in importance, we instead
use mobile-to-mobile (M2M) termination rates in our regressions. Nevertheless, in France F2M
and M2M are the same due to non-discrimination obligations. Two points are worth noting:
firstly, due to the increasing importance of mobile data, the share of M2M termination rates in
operators’ revenues is decreasing and the regulation of these charges is becoming less important.
Secondly, the theoretical literature does not provide clear conclusions on the impact of M2M
termination rates on retail prices (see Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998)).
In France, the M2M and F2M termination rates are determined by ARCEP in a relevant
market analysis. The price caps are set on the basis of long-run incremental costs (LRIC) follow-
ing bottom-up approach, which takes into account network design (technologies and coverage),
traffic (volume, busy-hour characteristics) and cost (capex, opex, asset lifetime).13 As shown in
12The termination rate is the fee that Operator A pays Operator B when one of A’s customers calls one of B’s
customers. Operator B is paid for the cost of carrying the call on its network.
13Based on the European Commission’s Recommendation from 2009, MTRs should be set on a ‘pure LRIC’
basis, i.e., reflecting the long run incremental cost exclusive of any fixed and common costs. See “Commission
Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU - Implications
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Figure 2, the M2M termination rates declined over time.
Figure 2: Mobile-to-mobile termination rates in France
Source: ARCEP
In addition, operators often state that regulating roaming charges will result in higher retail
prices. For this reason, we consider the impact of roaming regulation on retail prices. Roaming
charges within the European Union are regulated by the European Commission, which sets both
the charges a mobile network operator can impose on its subscribers for using telephone and
data services outside of the network’s country, and the wholesale rates networks can charge
each other to allow their subscribers access to each other’s networks. Since 2007, the roaming
regulations have steadily lowered the maximum roaming charges allowable. Figure 3 shows euro-
tariffs, which are the retail price-cap that cannot be exceeded by the operators when charging
fees to their customers for calling and using Internet in another EU country.
for Industry, Competition and Consumers (07/05/2009)”.
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Figure 3: Euro-tariffs and wholesale roaming price caps in the EU
Source: European Commission
3 The Data
For the purpose of our analysis, we combine the following data sets. First, we use a complete
list of mobile tariffs offered between May 2011 and December 2014 offered by Orange, the main
mobile operator in France.14 Even though we use price information for a single firm, we can
demonstrate that our price index is representative for the whole industry.15
The number of unique tariffs in this period was 1,112 and the number of available tariffs
on a monthly basis with repetitions was 7,346. Each tariff is characterized by: (i) voice and
data allowances; (ii) unit prices of voice and data over the voice and data allowances; (iii)
indicator of quadruple play tariff (QP), which includes a fixed access to Internet via DSL or FttH
technology; (iv) indicator for handset subsidy; (v) commitment period of 12 or 24 months; (vi)
14In general, detailed historical pricing information for mobile telecommunications services is not easily available
because of a large number of tariffs which change on monthly basis. We obtained detailed information on monthly
basis using tariff catalogs from Orange. Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to get tariff information in such
level of detail for the other market players.
15We used data from a consultancy firm Teligen to compare prices of Orange and SFR for different market
segments. For all market segments the prices of Orange and SFR are comparable and change in a similar manner
over time.
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indicator for low-cost tariffs without commitment; (vii) premium access to music streaming called
Deezer. Each tariff has a unique identifier which is associated with the set of characteristics.
Whenever any of these characteristics changes, the tariff is considered to be different with a new
identifier. Table 1 shows the number of unique tariffs with the starting date in a given year with
summary statistics for their characteristics. When there is a promotion and a tariff is offered
at a lower price, it is considered to be a new tariff with a different identifier. Thus, we are
directly able to take promotions into consideration in our analysis. Moreover, some tariffs may
include allowances for the use of data and voice abroad. We account for unlimited international
calls and voice roaming included in tariff, but we do not have information about data roaming
charges to include them in the analysis. In hedonic price regressions we cluster the error terms
using the tariff identifier, thus allowing for correlation between observations of the same tariff.
Table 1: Summary statistics for tariffs
Year Av.Price Av.Data Av.Voice Share of unlimited Share of Share of QP
allowance allowance calls plan (%) low-cost (%) tariffs (%)
2011 45.1 0.60 118.3 6.2 1.4 10.4
2012 43.2 0.75 105.3 20.1 2.0 13.5
2013 40.2 1.04 95.1 37.7 3.8 22.7
2014 40.5 1.69 76.1 40.8 5.9 29.7
All 42.1 1.03 100.3 31.9 3.2 19.5
Prices are in euros, data allowance in GB and voice allowance in minutes.
Second, we use an unbalanced panel of roughly 116,100 customers observed between May
2011 and December 2014 provided by Orange to compute the number of subscribers to each
tariff in each month. These figures are used as weights in the hedonic price regressions. The list
of available tariffs in each month and the number of subscribers per tariff are merged together.
Third, information about the level of M2M termination rates are collected from the website of
ARCEP and information on roaming price caps from the website of the European Commission.
The information on market shares of mobile operators in France comes from a consultancy firm
Yankee Group.
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4 Econometric Model
We estimate the impact of tariff characteristics and monthly dummy variables on the cost of
tariffs based on the following hedonic price regression:
yit = α+Xitβ + δkdt1(k = t) + uit (1)
where yit denotes the list price in Euros of tariff i which was available in month t.16 The vector
of tariff characteristics Xit includes: (i) dummy variables for unlimited national and unlimited
national/international voice calls; (ii) voice allowance for tariffs with limited voice minutes; (iii)
dummy variables for data allowance of 0.5 GB, 1 GB, 2 GB, 3 GB, 5 GB, 6 GB, 10 GB and
14 GB; (iv) dummy variables for quadruple play tariff with DSL and FttH connections; (v) a
dummy variable for handset subsidy; (vi) dummy variables for commitment period of 12 and
24 months; (vii) dummy variables for low-cost mobile plans and fixed-price contract;17 (viii) a
dummy variable for a discount of 5 Euros for 3G tariffs at the time of launching 4G tariffs.18
At the time of introduction of 4G services, new tariffs were introduced offering 4G Internet
access, while exactly the same tariffs with 3G Internet access were offered with a discount of 5
Euros. The estimated coefficients δt of the monthly dummy variables dt1(k = t) represent the
quality-adjusted price index. The normally distributed error term is denoted by uit, and the
vector of coefficients γ = (α, β, δ) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted
least squares (WLS) with weights being the shares of subscribers to a particular tariffs in a given
month.19
In a next step, we regress the quality-adjusted price index δt on a set of competition, invest-
16As a robustness check, we also estimate the model using log of dependent variable, for which the resulting
quality-adjusted price index remains unchanged.
17A fixed-price contract is a tariff which ensures that consumer’s bill does not surpass the price of tariff. For
these tariffs, consumption beyond allowances is not possible. These contracts are mostly targeted at teenagers.
18Another tariff characteristics which may influence price is sponsored data which is currently under regulatory
debate. There was no sponsored data in the period of our analysis.
19It is common to use weights when computing changes in prices over time. This is also the case of consumer
price index (CPI) which is used as a measure of inflation.
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ment and regulation variables:
δt = γ + Ztη +Rtλ+ εt (2)
where Zt denotes a set of dummy variables for competition and investments: (i) the introduction
of new tariffs without commitment and handset subsidies; (ii) entry of Free Mobile; (iii) launch of
4G networks by SFR, Orange, Bouygues and Free Mobile; and Rt includes regulatory variables:
mobile termination rates on Orange’s network and wholesale roaming price caps for voice and
data. Finally, εt is normally distributed error term.
5 Estimation Results
We show our estimation results in two parts. We start with the estimation results of the hedonic
price equation (1) in Subsection 5.1 and then provide the estimation results of the quality-
adjusted price equation (2) in Subsection 5.2. Finally in Subsection 5.4, we compare our results
to other price indices which are constructed using the consumer usage basket methodology.
These indices are commonly used by the OECD, European Commission and national regulators
including ARCEP in France.
5.1 Hedonic Price Regressions
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the hedonic price equation (1) based on all tariffs using
OLS in column (1) and WLS in column (2).20 Both regressions have relatively high R-squared
values equal to 0.74 for OLS and 0.85 for WLS. We discuss the results of WLS estimation because
it accounts for differences in the popularity of tariffs.
All tariff characteristics in the regressions are highly significant with the expected signs.
Data and voice allowances have a positive impact on the cost of tariffs. For instance, compared
to tariffs without data allowance, tariffs with 2 GB data allowance are about 15.3 Euros more
expensive, with 5 GB allowance are about 33.5 Euros more expensive and with 14 GB allowance
20The estimates of 44 monthly dummy variables for these two regressions are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix
A due to space constraints.
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are about 138.6 Euros more expensive. If a tariff is bundled with fixed broadband services,
an additional 25.4 Euros are added to the contract for DSL connection and 28.2 Euros for
FttH connection. Tariffs with unlimited national voice calls are 24.3 Euros more expensive and
tariffs with unlimited national and international calls are 27.9 Euros more expensive. For tariffs
with limited minutes, one minute costs about 11 cents. Tariffs with subsidized handsets are
on average 12 Euros more expensive. Tariffs with 24 months commitment are on average 7.2
Euros cheaper than tariffs without commitment and also tariffs with 12 months commitment.
Furthermore, web only tariffs are 18.7 Euros cheaper, while fixed price contracts are 6 Euros
cheaper. Finally, tariffs with 3G Internet are about 5.1 Euros cheaper than tariffs with 4G
Internet. As mentioned earlier, this is because at the time of introduction of 4G services, new
tariffs were introduced offering 4G Internet access, while exactly the same tariffs with 3G Internet
access were offered with a discount of 5 Euros.21 We also include in the estimations premium
access to music streaming called Deezer. This option was available for about 20% of the tariffs
with commitment. The impact of this variable is not significant in the WLS regressions. Deezer
was the only over-the-top content (OTT) which was included in selected tariffs.
We plot the estimated coefficients of the monthly dummy variables for both OLS and WLS
regressions in Figure 4. These coefficients reflect the quality-adjusted price index. The estimates
of time dummy variables are highly significant and become more negative over time relative to
the starting month which is May 2011. This means that quality-adjusted prices decrease over
time. We observe that the decline in quality-adjusted prices is slow at the early period of our
data but then accelerates with a particularly large decrease in April-May 2013. In an attempt to
associate particular market events with observed price changes we plot three vertical lines. The
first line reflects the reaction of incumbents to the announced entry of Free Mobile by launching
new tariffs without commitment, to which we refer as low-cost or ‘fighting’ brands.22 The second
one is the actual entry of Free Mobile and the third one is the launch of 4G networks and in
consequence the introduction of 4G tariffs.
21The advertised speed for mobile tariffs is 4G and only in very few cases H+.
22In marketing, a ‘fighting brand’ is a lower-priced offering launched by a company to combat a competitor
that is threatening to take market shares away from a company’s main brand. See Johnson and Myatt (2003) for
a theoretical exposition and Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2016) for a structural analysis of the mobile industry
in France at the time of entry of Free Mobile.
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Table 2: Hedonic price regressions for all tariffs
(1) (2)
OLS WLS
Data allowance
Data=0.5GB 7.27∗∗∗ (0.45) 4.22∗∗∗ (0.65)
Data=1GB 13.34∗∗∗ (0.97) 9.81∗∗∗ (0.82)
Data=2GB 25.06∗∗∗ (0.78) 15.30∗∗∗ (0.82)
Data=3GB 35.80∗∗∗ (1.41) 21.39∗∗∗ (1.71)
Data=5GB 43.51∗∗∗ (1.76) 33.50∗∗∗ (1.76)
Data=6GB 64.45∗∗∗ (5.23) 41.19∗∗∗ (1.80)
Data=10GB 99.66∗∗∗ (17.60) 82.92∗∗∗ (15.82)
Data=14GB 150.12∗∗∗ (1.59) 138.60∗∗∗ (1.19)
Bundle with fixed line
Quadruple Play with broadband internet 23.07∗∗∗ (0.54) 25.43∗∗∗ (0.46)
Quadruple Play with fiber internet 24.62∗∗∗ (0.80) 28.23∗∗∗ (0.60)
Voice
Voice allowance in minute if not unlimited 0.09∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
Dummy for unlimited national calls 25.60∗∗∗ (1.76) 24.33∗∗∗ (0.83)
Dummy for unlimited international calls 38.75∗∗∗ (5.93) 27.87∗∗∗ (2.17)
Other attributes
Handset subsidy dummy 14.57∗∗∗ (0.52) 12.01∗∗∗ (0.52)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=12 -3.98∗∗∗ (0.59) -2.24 (1.38)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=24 -7.97∗∗∗ (0.61) -7.18∗∗∗ (1.32)
Discount 3G=1 -17.77∗∗∗ (2.60) -5.12∗∗ (1.54)
Web-only mobile plan -23.30∗∗∗ (1.45) -18.66∗∗∗ (1.95)
Dummy for fixed price contract -7.60∗∗∗ (0.44) -6.04∗∗∗ (0.64)
Dummy for music steaming -3.87∗∗∗ (0.70) -0.11 (0.71)
Month dummies YES YES
Constant 17.98∗∗∗ (0.86) 17.36∗∗∗ (1.73)
Observations 7306 7306
R2 0.74 0.85
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Data allowance reference group is zero allowance. Data allowances below 0.5 are grouped in data=0.5. Data
allowance of 4GB are grouped with data allowance of 5GB. Data allowance of 7GB are grouped with allowance
of 6GB. Data allowance of 0.5GB are grouped with allowance of 1GB for low-cost data allowance.
We notice that prices seem to react with a lag to the introduction of low-cost brands. The
acceleration of the price decrease starts soon after the incumbents introduced low-cost brands
but before the entry of Free Mobile. After Free Mobile had entered the market, Orange tar-
iffs experienced further reductions in quality-adjusted prices. The largest price drop in our
observation period seems to have been induced by the introduction of 4G tariffs. Afterwards,
quality-adjusted prices still decline but at a much slower rate. For a comparison, we also show
the estimates of monthly dummy coefficients based on the OLS estimation without any tariff
characteristics, which reflect price changes without adjusting for quality. These prices decreased
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only by approximately 11% during the period of this analysis, as opposed to the 42.8% decrease
in quality-adjusted prices. In summary, the rapid improvement in the service offered meant that
the price per characteristic was falling far faster than the price of the service in general.
Figure 4: Monthly coefficients (+ weighted average price in May 2011) for all tariffs
Note: The weighted average price of all tariffs in May 2011 was 44.2e.
As the entry of Free Mobile might affect low-cost tariffs rather the classic tariffs, we addition-
ally distinguish between these two categories of tariffs and run separate hedonic price regressions.
Table 3 shows the estimation results based on WLS.23 The results are broadly comparable to
the estimation for all tariffs, except for the magnitude of some variables. For instance, compared
to tariffs without data allowance, tariffs with 2 GB data allowance are about 20.6 Euros more
expensive for classic tariffs and 8 Euros for low-cost tariffs. The cost of a minute in tariffs with
allowance is about 11 cents for classic tariffs and 2 cents for low-cost tariffs.
Again, we plot the estimated coefficients of the monthly dummies. Figure 5 shows them
separately for classic tariffs and low-cost tariffs and in comparison to previous estimates for all
tariffs based on WLS. The estimates of monthly dummy variables differ significantly across tariff
categories, which suggests that quality-adjusted prices for classic and low-cost tariffs follow a
23Again, due to space constraints we show the estimated coefficients of monthly dummy variables for these
regressions in Table A.2 in the Appendix A.
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Table 3: Hedonic price regressions for classic and low-cost tariffs (WLS)
(1) (2)
Classic tariffs Low-cost tariffs
Data allowance
Data=0.5GB 7.98∗∗∗ (0.36)
Data=1GB 12.74∗∗∗ (0.77) 5.96∗∗∗ (0.87)
Data=2GB 20.62∗∗∗ (0.52) 8.02∗∗∗ (0.98)
Data=3GB 27.98∗∗∗ (1.77) 10.39∗∗∗ (0.20)
Data=5GB 38.12∗∗∗ (1.38) 12.40∗∗∗ (1.04)
Data=6GB 46.26∗∗∗ (1.88)
Data=10GB 87.88∗∗∗ (15.67)
Data=14GB 144.10∗∗∗ (1.18)
Bundle with fixed line
Quadruple Play with broadband internet 24.69∗∗∗ (0.42) 26.33∗∗∗ (0.71)
Quadruple Play with fiber internet 27.47∗∗∗ (0.58)
Voice
Voice allowance in minute if not unlimited 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗ (0.01)
Dummy for unlimited national calls 25.71∗∗∗ (0.88) 7.57∗∗∗ (1.06)
Dummy for unlimited international calls 28.78∗∗∗ (2.12)
Other attributes
Handset subsidy dummy 10.87∗∗∗ (0.57)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=12 -3.22∗ (1.42)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=24 -8.00∗∗∗ (1.35)
Discount 3G=1 -6.22∗∗∗ (1.59) 1.56 (0.93)
Web-only mobile plan 0.00 (.)
Dummy for fixed price contract -6.27∗∗∗ (0.56) 0.37 (0.22)
Dummy for music steaming -1.26 (0.94)
Month dummies YES YES
Constant 17.12∗∗∗ (1.73) 16.46∗∗∗ (1.28)
Observations 7094 212
R2 0.85 0.98
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Data allowance reference group is zero allowance. Data allowances below 0.5 are grouped in data=0.5. Data
allowance of 4GB are grouped with data allowance of 5GB. Data allowance of 7GB are grouped with allowance
of 6GB. Data allowance of 0.5GB are grouped with allowance of 1GB for low-cost data allowance.
different pattern over time. The low-cost tariffs were introduced shortly before entry of Free
Mobile and their quality-adjusted price decreased when Free Mobile entered the market in
January 2012, and again around the time when 4G networks were launched, but remained
roughly constant afterwards. The quality-adjusted prices for classic tariffs declined across the
entire period, but experienced a particularly sharp drop when the 4G networks were launched.
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Figure 5: Monthly coefficients (+ weighted average price in the first period) for classic and
low-cost tariffs
Note: The weighted average price of tariffs in May 2011 was 44.2e. The weighted average price
of low-cost tariffs was 26.6ein October 2011
5.2 Determinants of Quality-Adjusted Price Index
For the second part of our analysis, we use the estimated coefficients of the 44 monthly dummy
variables which form the quality-adjusted price index and serve as the dependent variable in our
second set of regressions. It should be acknowledged that the number of observations in this
regression is very small and the results should be interpreted with caution.
First, we use the estimates for all tariffs from Table A.1 and then the estimates which we ob-
tain from the separate regressions for classic and low-cost tariffs from Table A.2 in the Appendix
A. We regress the quality-adjusted prices on variables that describe competition, investments
and regulation. Competition is driven by the introduction of low-cost brands and entry of Free
Mobile. We also approximate competition by Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) as is com-
monly done in empirical studies. The value of HHI index declined from 3154 in April 2011 to
2429 in December 2014, which suggests that the industry became more competitive. Investments
are related to the launch of 4G networks by SFR, Orange, Bouygues and Free Mobile. Regu-
lation is approximated by mobile termination rates on Orange network and wholesale roaming
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price caps for voice and data. As shown in Figures (2) and (3), mobile termination rates and
wholesale roaming price caps decrease stepwise over time.
The quality-adjusted prices are not only affected by competition between network operators,
but also by competition from other messaging applications such as ’Whatsapp’. However, the
penetration rate of messaging applications in France was very low, as stated in the communi-
cations between the European Commission and ARCEP with respect to market definition for
termination of SMSs on mobile networks.24 This may be due to the fact that prices of SMSs
were low in France as a result of regulation. Also, all tariffs in our database include unlimited
messaging. Accordingly, we do not consider that messaging applications played an important
role in the time period of our analysis.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. We estimate two model specifications with
either HHI index or dummy variable for entry of Free Mobile because both variables approximate
competition and are highly correlated. Free Mobile managed to gain substantial market share
very fast which led to lower value of HHI index. The HHI index is also highly correlated with
the regulatory variables, values of which declined over time and with dummy variables for the
launch of 4G networks.
The results indicate that, in itself, the introduction of low-cost brands by itself had no
impact on the quality-adjusted prices of classic tariffs. Decreases in the prices of classic tariffs
coincided with two events. First, there was a drop by 5.05 Euros on average after entry of
Free Mobile. Second, the main reduction by 8.55 Euros on average came with the launch of
4G network by Orange. Prices also declined with the launch of 4G network by SFR which
took place a few months before Orange (with significance level of 10%). When included in the
estimation, the HHI index is positive and significant in the regression for all tariffs, but it is
insignificant in the other two regressions for classic and low-cost tariffs, though it does have a
positive sign. In the regression for low-cost tariffs the 4G launch variables become insignificant
due to collinearity with HHI. The regulatory variables used in the regression do not have a
significant impact on the quality-adjusted prices of all and classic tariffs in separation, though
they significantly impact low-cost tariffs. However, since wholesale roaming price caps for voice
24Source: European Commission C(2014) 9270 final.
20
and data and mobile termination rates are highly correlated, it is difficult to comment on the
impact of particular regulatory variables. An F-test, testing the joint significance of regulatory
variables, does not reject the hypothesis that the regulatory variables have a joint significant
impact on the quality-adjusted prices for classic tariffs.
In the regression for low-cost tariffs, the entry of Free Mobile had a negative impact on
the level of quality-adjusted prices, which dropped on average by 4.98 Euros. There is also
a significant but smaller effect of the launch of 4G networks by SFR, which led to decline of
low-cost tariffs by 1.92 Euros on average. Termination rates have a significant and positive
impact. Thus, higher termination rates lead to higher quality-adjusted prices. The roaming
price caps for voice and data are also significant, but with opposing signs, which may be due to
a high correlation of 0.95. The impact of regulatory variables should be therefore interpreted
with caution. Again, testing the joint significance of regulatory variables does not reject the
hypothesis that the regulatory variables have a joint significant impact on the quality-adjusted
prices for low-cost tariffs.
Since classic tariffs have a greater weight in the price index than low-cost tariffs, the esti-
mation results for all tariffs are similar to the estimation results for classic tariffs. The entry of
Free Mobile reduced prices on average by 4.31 Euros and the launch of 4G tariffs by Orange by
6.99 Euros, while the lunch of 4G tariffs by SFR led to additional reduction by 2.83 Euros. The
regulatory variables are significant jointly but not separately. Our results confirm that low-cost
tariffs were introduced to compete with new entrant, Free Mobile, while classic tariffs compete
with the other established operators in the market.25
Overall, the weighted average cost of classic tariffs (weighted by sales) increased marginally
from 44.2 Euros in May 2011 to 44.4 Euros in December 2014. In the same time period, the
quality-adjusted classic price index declined by 49%, as indicated by time coefficients plotted
on Figure 5. The weighted average cost of low-cost tariffs declined by 34.9% from 26.6 Euros
at their launch in October 2011 to 17.3 Euros in December 2014. In the same time period, the
25We also estimated the same models for all, classic and low-cost tariffs in which we in addition used the number
of 4G antennas deployed countrywide by four network operators. The number of 4G antennas is not significant
in all three regressions. The other variables remain significant and the same conclusions can be drawn. The
estimation results can be provided upon request.
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quality-adjusted low-cost price index declined by 54%. Finally, the weighted average cost of all
tariffs declined by 8.7% from 44.2 Euros in May 2011 to 40.4 Euros in December 2014, while
the quality-adjusted price index declined by 42.8%.26
We can compute the contribution of competition and investments to these price declines. The
contribution of competition is the summation of coefficients on competition variables divided by
total price decline in absolute value. The contribution of investments ic calculated similarly. In
percentage terms, competition is responsible for about 23.4% of total price decline for all tariffs
and investments for 56.1%. Classic tariffs declined by 25.1% due to competition and by 52.9%
due to investments, while low-cost tariffs declined by 38.4% due to competition and 21.1% due
to investments.
5.3 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, we estimate separate hedonic price regressions year by year for all tariffs.
The estimation results are shown in Table A.3 in Appendix A. The range of tariffs with particular
characteristics changes from year to year and the estimates of coefficients show some differences.
In particular, new tariffs with greater data allowances were introduced in years 2013 and 2014.
Figure 6 shows evolution of quality-adjusted prices based on these regressions. The resulting
price index is very similar to the price index shown in Figure 4. The quality-adjusted prices
decline over time with two main drops at the time of entry of Free Mobile and at the time of
launch of 4G networks, thus leading to the same conclusions.
26The quality-adjusted price indices result from separate regressions. Hence, the price index for all tariffs is not
an average of price indices for classic and low-cost tariffs.
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Table 4: OLS with time dummies coefficient from hedonic regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All tariffs All tariffs Classic tariffs Classic tariffs Low-cost tariffs Low-cost tariffs
Low-cost brands -0.20 0.06 -0.48 -0.28 0.00 0.00
(1.24) (1.24) (1.42) (1.47) (.) (.)
Sfr 4G -2.83∗∗ -1.80 -1.89 -0.93 -1.92∗∗ -0.77
(0.98) (1.04) (1.12) (1.23) (0.65) (0.57)
Orange 4G -6.99∗∗∗ -5.92∗∗∗ -8.55∗∗∗ -7.51∗∗∗ -0.79 0.04
(1.01) (1.03) (1.16) (1.22) (0.51) (0.58)
Bouygues 4G -1.15 -0.78 -1.60 -1.35 -0.06 0.01
(1.30) (1.32) (1.49) (1.56) (0.64) (0.72)
Free 4G 0.17 0.83 0.39 0.99 -0.25 0.12
(1.24) (1.25) (1.42) (1.48) (0.60) (0.70)
MTR Orange -3.33 -1.66 -4.63 -0.83 8.50∗ 14.43∗∗∗
(4.26) (3.40) (4.88) (4.01) (3.30) (2.56)
Wholesale roaming voice -0.13 0.09 -0.14 0.24 0.59∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.35) (0.49) (0.41) (0.24) (0.19)
Wholesale roaming data 0.18 0.06 0.22 0.04 -0.23∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.07)
Dummy Free -4.31 -5.05 -4.98∗∗
(2.20) (2.52) (1.74)
HHI 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant -1.67 -40.20∗∗ -1.19 -37.77∗ -15.07∗ -42.85∗∗∗
(7.54) (13.19) (8.63) (15.57) (5.55) (9.68)
Observations 44 44 44 44 39 39
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.97
F-stat(All variables) 100.57 101.91 93.45 88.94 146.31 121.06
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat (Regulatory) 3.25 1.20 3.49 1.49 3.52 14.16
Prob > F 0.033 0.325 0.026 0.234 0.027 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 6: Monthly coefficients for year-by-year regressions (+ average weighted price in the first
month for all tariffs
Note: The average weighted price of all tariffs in May 2011 was 44.2e.
5.4 Comparison to Other Indices
We also compare the quality-adjusted price index constructed using our hedonic price regression
with price indices constructed using the consumer usage basket methodology, which is commonly
used by the OECD, European Commission and national regulators including ARCEP in France.
Table C.1 in the Appendix B shows definitions of different usage baskets according to ARCEP
and the OECD and their evolution in years 2011-2014. While the OECD baskets stay constant
over time, the ARCEP baskets take into account potential changes in the consumer behavior
in France. To obtain a price index for these baskets, we calculate the bill of a representative
consumer with a given usage basket using all tariff plans of Orange, which are available in each
month. Next, we select the tariff which yields the lowest bill in a month. We first do this for all
tariffs and then for tariffs with handset subsidy only. Price index constructed based on tariffs
with handset subsidy corresponds to classic tariffs in our analysis and price index constructed
based on all tariffs corresponds to low-cost tariffs.27
27Figures (C.1) and (C.2) in the Appendix B show price indices constructed using ARCEP basket methodology,
respectively based on the price of the cheapest tariff among all tariffs considered and based on the cheapest tariff
with handset subsidy. Figures (C.3) and (C.4) also in the Appendix B show analogous price indices for OECD
baskets.
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Table 5: OLS with prices based on ARCEP and OECD baskets
Prices from Prices from Prices from Prices from
ARCEP baskets ARCEP baskets OECD baskets OECD baskets
All tariffs Only handset sub. All tariffs Only handset sub.
Low-cost brands -38.28∗∗∗ -12.33∗∗∗ -38.28∗∗∗ -11.51∗∗
(2.21) (3.24) (2.21) (3.26)
Sfr 4G -4.53∗ -2.48 -4.52∗ -0.92
(1.75) (2.56) (1.75) (2.58)
Orange 4G -4.39∗ -15.01∗∗∗ -4.37∗ -16.92∗∗∗
(1.80) (2.63) (1.80) (2.65)
Bouygues 4G -0.61 1.06 -0.60 0.75
(2.32) (3.40) (2.32) (3.43)
Free 4G 0.26 -0.18 0.26 -0.14
(2.20) (3.22) (2.20) (3.25)
MTR Orange 27.63∗∗∗ -13.51 27.57∗∗∗ -4.49
(7.59) (11.12) (7.58) (11.20)
Wholesale roaming voice 1.62∗ -2.65∗ 1.61∗ -1.94
(0.76) (1.11) (0.76) (1.12)
Wholesale roaming data -0.77∗ 1.27∗∗ -0.77∗ 0.93∗
(0.30) (0.45) (0.30) (0.45)
Dummy Free -1.25 -21.41∗∗∗ -1.28 -18.72∗∗
(3.92) (5.74) (3.92) (5.79)
Constant 32.21∗ 93.31∗∗∗ 32.30∗ 81.54∗∗∗
(13.42) (19.66) (13.40) (19.80)
Observations 44 44 44 44
R2 0.989 0.973 0.989 0.975
F-stat(All variables) 327.38 137.08 327.85 144.46
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat (Regulatory) 8.22 15.38 8.22 14.15
Prob > F 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To compare the baskets approach with our quality-adjusted price indices, we now regress
selected OECD and ARCEP baskets on competition, investment and regulation variables. The
estimation results are shown in Table 5. These regressions broadly confirm our conclusions.
Low-cost brands introduced to pre-empt entry of Free Mobile and launch of 4G networks are
the main contributors to price reductions. As before, the effect of low-cost brands is stronger on
the price indices based on all tariffs and the effect of 4G launch is stronger for the price indices
based on tariffs with handset subsidy. The impact of regulatory variables has a joint significant
impact.
The price indices based on the OECD and ARCEP baskets suggest stronger reductions due to
entry of Free Mobile and launch of low-cost brands than were seen in the quality-adjusted price
index based on hedonic regressions, while the effect of investments in 4G networks appears to be
25
smaller. When comparing these different methodologies, there are strong reasons to prefer the
hedonic price approach. First, the methodology using baskets considers the cost of a bill paid
by a representative consumer, and the quality-adjusted price index represents the producer’s
price after controlling for quality of tariffs, as a result the latter is independent on usage which
is an advantage. Second, by using quantities as weights we account for the popularity of tariffs.
The basket method, however, cannot consider consumer preferences. It also assumes perfectly
rational behavior of the representative consumer choosing the cheapest tariff.
6 Conclusions
Using a database that includes tariffs offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in
France, Orange, between May 2011 and December 2014, we assessed the impacts of competition,
investment into a new technology (4G) and of regulation, on prices of mobile services. In
a first step, we estimated hedonic price regressions that accounted for the effect of product
characteristics and obtained a quality-adjusted prices index. In a second step, we used this
price index and related it to variables measuring competition, investments and regulation in the
industry. We looked at all tariffs, classic contract tariffs with commitment, and low-cost tariffs
without commitment, which were introduced by Orange in October 2011 before the entry of
fourth mobile operator, Free Mobile.
Over the analyzed time period, the quality-adjusted price index obtained decreased by about
51% whilst the decline in average prices without quality-adjustment was only 8.7%. We find
that main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment was the launch of 4G
networks by mobile operators. Low-cost tariffs without commitment, which were introduced to
pre-empt the entry of a low-cost competitor, declined mainly at the time of entry of Free Mobile.
Moreover, we find that regulation, which is approximated by the level of mobile termination
charges and international roaming price caps for voice and data, has a joint significant impact
on quality-adjusted prices.
In percentage terms, competition measured by the launch of low-cost brands and entry of
Free Mobile, is responsible for about 23.4%, and investment into the 4G technology is responsible
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for about 56.1% of the total price decline, with the remaining effect being regulation and other
factors. Classic tariffs declined by 25.1% due to competition, and by 52.9% due to investments,
while low-cost tariffs declined by 38.4% due to competition and by 21.1% due to investments.
Thus, our main conclusion is that the reduction in quality-adjusted prices in the last years
was largely caused by competition between operators for a new technology (4G). The entry of
a fourth low-cost operator also induced a quality-adjusted price decrease, although at a lower
scale.
Our results are also robust in comparison to other constructed price indices. When we
compare the results from our hedonic price regressions with the alternative OECD and ARCEP
basket approach, we can draw similar conclusions. However, we consider that hedonic price
regressions represent a more accurate methodology to assess price changes of telecommunications
markets and should be preferred by the regulators.
The results of the second stage of our empirical analysis, which is based on only 44 observa-
tions, have to be taken cautiously. This emphasizes the importance of further research by, for
example, investigating other countries as well, or extending the time period so that we could also
include the future development of 5G networks. Keeping the limitations of our analysis in mind,
the policy implications of our analysis are threefold. First, competition for new technologies
matters. Firms competing for being able to provide consumers the newest technology do so also
by offering lower (quality-adjusted) prices. Second, the entry of the low-cost firm Free Mobile
was good for competition, but to a smaller extent than the introduction of a new technology.
However, we cannot say anything about the investment effect if there were only three firms in
the market. And finally, at this stage in the life-cycle of the mobile industry, the contribution
of regulation to the quality-adjusted price decrease is smaller than of competition.
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A Appendix: Hedonic Price Regressions
Table A.1: Hedonic price regressions for all tariffs
(1) (2)
OLS WLS
Data allowance
Data=0.5GB 7.27∗∗∗ (0.45) 4.22∗∗∗ (0.65)
Data=1GB 13.34∗∗∗ (0.97) 9.81∗∗∗ (0.82)
Data=2GB 25.06∗∗∗ (0.78) 15.30∗∗∗ (0.82)
Data=3GB 35.80∗∗∗ (1.41) 21.39∗∗∗ (1.71)
Data=5GB 43.51∗∗∗ (1.76) 33.50∗∗∗ (1.76)
Data=6GB 64.45∗∗∗ (5.23) 41.19∗∗∗ (1.80)
Data=10GB 99.66∗∗∗ (17.60) 82.92∗∗∗ (15.82)
Data=14GB 150.12∗∗∗ (1.59) 138.60∗∗∗ (1.19)
Bundle with fixed line
Quadruple Play with broadband internet 23.07∗∗∗ (0.54) 25.43∗∗∗ (0.46)
Quadruple Play with fiber internet 24.62∗∗∗ (0.80) 28.23∗∗∗ (0.60)
Voice
Voice allowance in minute if not unlimited 0.09∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
Dummy for unlimited national calls 25.60∗∗∗ (1.76) 24.33∗∗∗ (0.83)
Dummy for unlimited international calls 38.75∗∗∗ (5.93) 27.87∗∗∗ (2.17)
Other attributes
Handset subsidy dummy 14.57∗∗∗ (0.52) 12.01∗∗∗ (0.52)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=12 -3.98∗∗∗ (0.59) -2.24 (1.38)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=24 -7.97∗∗∗ (0.61) -7.18∗∗∗ (1.32)
Discount 3G=1 -17.77∗∗∗ (2.60) -5.12∗∗ (1.54)
Web-only mobile plan -23.30∗∗∗ (1.45) -18.66∗∗∗ (1.95)
Dummy for fixed price contract -7.60∗∗∗ (0.44) -6.04∗∗∗ (0.64)
Dummy for music steaming -3.87∗∗∗ (0.70) -0.11 (0.71)
Month dummies
May 2011 0.00 (.) 0.00 (.)
June 2011 -1.28∗∗∗ (0.05) -0.62∗∗∗ (0.05)
July 2011 -0.83∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.46∗∗∗ (0.06)
Aug 2011 -0.66∗∗∗ (0.05) -1.87∗∗∗ (0.08)
Sep 2011 -0.07 (0.10) -1.88∗∗∗ (0.06)
Oct 2011 0.38∗ (0.18) -2.33∗∗∗ (0.11)
Nov 2011 -2.06∗∗∗ (0.07) -1.42∗∗∗ (0.18)
Dec 2011 -0.90∗∗∗ (0.12) -1.67∗∗∗ (0.16)
Jan 2012 -2.07∗∗∗ (0.12) -2.38∗∗∗ (0.19)
Feb 2012 -2.06∗∗∗ (0.21) -3.35∗∗∗ (0.26)
March 2012 -2.49∗∗∗ (0.24) -4.50∗∗∗ (0.26)
Apr 2012 -3.98∗∗∗ (0.23) -5.34∗∗∗ (0.24)
May 2012 -4.63∗∗∗ (0.26) -5.19∗∗∗ (0.21)
June 2012 -5.54∗∗∗ (0.28) -5.62∗∗∗ (0.19)
July 2012 -4.95∗∗∗ (0.40) -6.46∗∗∗ (0.21)
Aug 2012 -4.56∗∗∗ (0.42) -6.82∗∗∗ (0.25)
Sep 2012 -6.88∗∗∗ (0.30) -6.60∗∗∗ (0.21)
Oct 2012 -5.44∗∗∗ (0.19) -7.63∗∗∗ (0.25)
Nov 2012 -7.51∗∗∗ (0.21) -8.62∗∗∗ (0.25)
Dec 2012 -7.07∗∗∗ (0.22) -8.59∗∗∗ (0.27)
Jan 2013 -6.32∗∗∗ (0.27) -8.27∗∗∗ (0.29)
Feb 2013 -7.97∗∗∗ (0.20) -10.02∗∗∗ (0.33)
March 2013 -8.37∗∗∗ (0.26) -10.68∗∗∗ (0.30)
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Apr 2013 -8.83∗∗∗ (0.18) -9.45∗∗∗ (0.25)
May 2013 -11.83∗∗∗ (0.38) -18.23∗∗∗ (0.41)
June 2013 -12.18∗∗∗ (0.35) -16.76∗∗∗ (0.47)
July 2013 -12.76∗∗∗ (0.34) -17.75∗∗∗ (0.48)
Aug 2013 -14.34∗∗∗ (0.31) -19.36∗∗∗ (0.61)
Sep 2013 -13.23∗∗∗ (0.25) -18.17∗∗∗ (0.34)
Oct 2013 -14.38∗∗∗ (0.23) -18.14∗∗∗ (0.30)
Nov 2013 -14.86∗∗∗ (0.29) -18.66∗∗∗ (0.32)
Dec 2013 -15.36∗∗∗ (0.32) -18.03∗∗∗ (0.32)
Jan 2014 -15.51∗∗∗ (0.36) -18.11∗∗∗ (0.36)
Feb 2014 -17.10∗∗∗ (0.55) -18.44∗∗∗ (0.39)
March 2014 -18.05∗∗∗ (0.61) -19.10∗∗∗ (0.54)
Apr 2014 -17.72∗∗∗ (0.48) -19.75∗∗∗ (0.73)
May 2014 -17.15∗∗∗ (0.52) -18.21∗∗∗ (0.26)
June 2014 -16.57∗∗∗ (0.45) -18.59∗∗∗ (0.38)
July 2014 -17.27∗∗∗ (0.55) -18.50∗∗∗ (0.41)
Aug 2014 -17.01∗∗∗ (0.48) -18.00∗∗∗ (0.36)
Sep 2014 -16.93∗∗∗ (0.54) -17.87∗∗∗ (0.37)
Oct 2014 -19.48∗∗∗ (0.65) -20.91∗∗∗ (0.37)
Nov 2014 -19.82∗∗∗ (1.00) -19.24∗∗∗ (0.51)
Dec 2014 -19.38∗∗∗ (0.67) -19.24∗∗∗ (0.52)
Constant 17.98∗∗∗ (0.86) 17.36∗∗∗ (1.73)
Observations 7306 7306
R2 0.74 0.85
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Data allowance reference group is zero allowance
Data allowances below 0.5 are grouped in data=0.5.
Data allowance of 4GB are grouped with data allowance of 5GB.
Data allowance of 7GB are grouped with allowance of 6GB
Discount for 3G tariffs was introduced when 4G tariffs were launched
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Table A.2: Hedonic price regressions for classic and low-cost tariffs
(1) (2)
WLS WLS
Classic tariffs Low-cost tariffs
Data allowance
Data=0.5GB 7.98∗∗∗ (0.36)
Data=1GB 12.74∗∗∗ (0.77) 5.96∗∗∗ (0.87)
Data=2GB 20.62∗∗∗ (0.52) 8.02∗∗∗ (0.98)
Data=3GB 27.98∗∗∗ (1.77) 10.39∗∗∗ (0.20)
Data=5GB 38.12∗∗∗ (1.38) 12.40∗∗∗ (1.04)
Data=6GB 46.26∗∗∗ (1.88)
Data=10GB 87.88∗∗∗ (15.67)
Data=14GB 144.10∗∗∗ (1.18)
Bundle with fixed line
Quadruple Play with broadband internet 24.69∗∗∗ (0.42) 26.33∗∗∗ (0.71)
Quadruple Play with fiber internet 27.47∗∗∗ (0.58)
Voice
Voice allowance in minute if not unlimited 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗ (0.01)
Dummy for unlimited national calls 25.71∗∗∗ (0.88) 7.57∗∗∗ (1.06)
Dummy for unlimited international calls 28.78∗∗∗ (2.12)
Other attributes
Handset subsidy dummy 10.87∗∗∗ (0.57)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=12 -3.22∗ (1.42)
Commitment period of the mobile plan=24 -8.00∗∗∗ (1.35)
Discount 3G=1 -6.22∗∗∗ (1.59) 1.56 (0.93)
Web-only mobile plan 0.00 (.)
Dummy for fixed price contract -6.27∗∗∗ (0.56) 0.37 (0.22)
Dummy for music steaming -1.26 (0.94)
Month dummies
May 2011 0.00 (.)
June 2011 -0.84∗∗∗ (0.04)
July 2011 -0.74∗∗∗ (0.04)
Aug 2011 -2.28∗∗∗ (0.07)
Sep 2011 -2.17∗∗∗ (0.07)
Oct 2011 -2.65∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.00 (.)
Nov 2011 -1.92∗∗∗ (0.19) 2.56∗∗∗ (0.50)
Dec 2011 -2.35∗∗∗ (0.18) -0.08 (0.32)
Jan 2012 -2.90∗∗∗ (0.18) -8.71∗∗∗ (0.25)
Feb 2012 -3.91∗∗∗ (0.27) -8.52∗∗∗ (0.64)
March 2012 -5.18∗∗∗ (0.26) -8.33∗∗∗ (0.73)
Apr 2012 -5.97∗∗∗ (0.24) -8.23∗∗∗ (0.78)
May 2012 -6.00∗∗∗ (0.21) -8.28∗∗∗ (0.76)
June 2012 -6.43∗∗∗ (0.18) -8.42∗∗∗ (0.70)
July 2012 -7.43∗∗∗ (0.23) -8.41∗∗∗ (0.74)
Aug 2012 -7.90∗∗∗ (0.26) -8.52∗∗∗ (0.68)
Sep 2012 -7.61∗∗∗ (0.22) -8.49∗∗∗ (0.74)
Oct 2012 -7.80∗∗∗ (0.25) -11.16∗∗∗ (0.96)
Nov 2012 -8.79∗∗∗ (0.25) -10.99∗∗∗ (0.93)
Dec 2012 -8.72∗∗∗ (0.27) -11.00∗∗∗ (0.93)
Jan 2013 -8.41∗∗∗ (0.29) -11.18∗∗∗ (0.96)
Feb 2013 -8.98∗∗∗ (0.26) -13.51∗∗∗ (0.80)
March 2013 -10.49∗∗∗ (0.26) -13.84∗∗∗ (0.88)
Apr 2013 -9.53∗∗∗ (0.25) -12.37∗∗∗ (0.77)
May 2013 -19.30∗∗∗ (0.46) -13.76∗∗∗ (0.89)
June 2013 -18.49∗∗∗ (0.56) -13.98∗∗∗ (0.89)
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July 2013 -19.76∗∗∗ (0.58) -13.82∗∗∗ (0.89)
Aug 2013 -21.18∗∗∗ (0.72) -13.84∗∗∗ (0.90)
Sep 2013 -20.41∗∗∗ (0.38) -13.69∗∗∗ (0.90)
Oct 2013 -20.37∗∗∗ (0.34) -13.54∗∗∗ (0.90)
Nov 2013 -20.69∗∗∗ (0.39) -13.74∗∗∗ (0.90)
Dec 2013 -20.39∗∗∗ (0.35) -13.63∗∗∗ (0.90)
Jan 2014 -20.35∗∗∗ (0.38) -13.55∗∗∗ (0.90)
Feb 2014 -20.73∗∗∗ (0.41) -14.02∗∗∗ (0.89)
March 2014 -21.41∗∗∗ (0.58) -14.14∗∗∗ (0.89)
Apr 2014 -21.54∗∗∗ (0.76) -14.09∗∗∗ (0.90)
May 2014 -19.58∗∗∗ (0.26) -14.07∗∗∗ (0.90)
June 2014 -20.21∗∗∗ (0.40) -14.14∗∗∗ (0.90)
July 2014 -20.01∗∗∗ (0.42) -14.05∗∗∗ (0.90)
Aug 2014 -19.70∗∗∗ (0.36) -14.76∗∗∗ (0.99)
Sep 2014 -19.70∗∗∗ (0.37) -14.85∗∗∗ (0.98)
Oct 2014 -23.43∗∗∗ (0.38) -14.28∗∗∗ (0.91)
Nov 2014 -21.89∗∗∗ (0.66) -14.26∗∗∗ (0.91)
Dec 2014 -22.00∗∗∗ (0.66) -14.30∗∗∗ (0.92)
Constant 17.12∗∗∗ (1.73) 16.46∗∗∗ (1.28)
Observations 7094 212
R2 0.85 0.98
There are only 39 periods of observation for low-costs tariffs as there were introduced in October 2011
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Data allowance reference group is zero allowance
Data allowances below 0.5 are grouped in data=0.5.
Data allowance of 4GB are grouped with data allowance of 5GB.
Data allowance of 7GB are grouped with allowance of 6GB
Data allowance of 0.5GB are grouped with allowance of 1GB for low-cost data allowance
Discount for 3G tariffs was introduced when 4G tariffs were launched
Table A.3: Hedonic price regressions for all tariffs year-by-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Data allowance
Data=0.5GB 8.13∗∗∗ (1.47) 5.97∗∗ (1.96) 0.48 (1.65) 0.48 (1.59)
Data=1GB 17.13∗∗∗ (3.94) 8.02∗∗∗ (2.03) 11.35∗∗∗ (2.23) 4.37∗ (1.70)
Data=2GB 18.78∗∗∗ (1.70) 15.97∗∗∗ (2.01) 12.22∗∗∗ (2.84) 10.37∗∗∗ (2.77)
Data=3GB 22.29∗∗ (7.74) 30.38∗∗∗ (3.24) 17.58∗∗∗ (2.63) 10.96∗∗∗ (1.46)
Data=5GB 29.72∗∗∗ (3.94) 21.99∗∗∗ (6.00)
Data=6GB 73.09∗∗ (22.64) 33.25∗∗∗ (3.30)
Data=10GB 82.06∗∗∗ (19.77)
Data=14GB 131.78∗∗∗ (2.07)
Bundle with fixed line
Quadruple Play with BB 22.61∗∗∗ (3.43) 22.68∗∗∗ (2.03) 26.57∗∗∗ (1.15) 25.56∗∗∗ (1.29)
Quadruple Play with Fiber 22.17∗∗∗ (4.70) 26.12∗∗∗ (1.65) 31.73∗∗∗ (1.43) 28.11∗∗∗ (1.95)
Voice
Voice allowance if not unlimited 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.05∗∗ (0.02)
Dummy for unlimited calls (nat.) 53.08∗∗∗ (5.43) 23.32∗∗∗ (2.52) 18.66∗∗∗ (2.68) 14.15∗∗∗ (1.84)
Dummy for unlimited calls (inter.) 116.37∗∗∗ (10.83) 60.01∗∗∗ (17.31) 19.93∗ (8.74) 13.35∗∗∗ (2.73)
Other attributes
Handset subsidy dummy 8.50∗∗∗ (1.58) 14.04∗∗∗ (2.24) 14.32∗∗∗ (0.99) 10.96∗∗∗ (1.13)
Commitment period =0 0.00 (.) 0.00 (.) 0.00 (.) 0.00 (.)
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Commitment period =12 -6.22∗∗∗ (1.31) -7.45∗∗ (2.45) -0.55 (3.13) 0.42 (1.10)
Commitment period =24 -11.33∗∗∗ (1.19) -10.87∗∗∗ (2.70) -5.37 (3.17) -4.41∗∗ (1.42)
Discount 3G=1 -40.30∗ (17.20) 0.07 (2.95) 3.20∗ (1.36)
Web-only mobile plan -34.64∗∗∗ (6.18) -24.60∗∗∗ (2.83) -14.70∗∗∗ (3.59) -9.51∗∗∗ (1.36)
Dummy for fixed price contract -10.24∗∗∗ (1.69) -7.74∗∗ (2.81) -3.85∗ (1.54) -1.79 (1.51)
Dummy for music steaming 2.35 (2.38) 1.75 (2.21) -0.64 (1.46) 1.21 (1.21)
Month dummies
May 2011 0.00 (.)
June 2011 -0.28 (0.39)
July 2011 -0.39 (0.50)
Aug 2011 -1.17 (0.72)
Sep 2011 -1.62 (0.95)
Oct 2011 -2.47 (1.47)
Nov 2011 -1.36 (1.40)
Dec 2011 -0.98 (1.37)
Jan 2012 0.00 (.)
Feb 2012 -1.48∗ (0.72)
March 2012 -2.57∗ (1.24)
Apr 2012 -3.43∗ (1.32)
May 2012 -3.44∗ (1.71)
June 2012 -3.90∗ (1.74)
July 2012 -4.53∗ (1.76)
Aug 2012 -4.82∗∗ (1.66)
Sep 2012 -4.50∗ (1.87)
Oct 2012 -5.36∗∗ (1.82)
Nov 2012 -6.29∗∗∗ (1.43)
Dec 2012 -6.28∗∗∗ (1.46)
Jan 2013 0.00 (.)
Feb 2013 -1.75 (1.11)
March 2013 -2.95 (1.56)
Apr 2013 -1.32 (1.25)
May 2013 -8.88∗∗∗ (1.83)
June 2013 -7.19∗∗∗ (1.65)
July 2013 -7.93∗∗∗ (1.57)
Aug 2013 -8.69∗∗∗ (1.60)
Sep 2013 -9.02∗∗∗ (1.50)
Oct 2013 -9.32∗∗∗ (1.52)
Nov 2013 -10.10∗∗∗ (1.59)
Dec 2013 -9.30∗∗∗ (1.54)
Jan 2014 0.00 (.)
Feb 2014 -0.47 (0.45)
March 2014 -0.97 (0.60)
Apr 2014 -1.20 (0.81)
May 2014 -1.81 (1.22)
June 2014 -1.80 (1.29)
July 2014 -1.64 (1.26)
Aug 2014 -1.91 (1.32)
Sep 2014 -1.95 (1.34)
Oct 2014 -2.48∗ (1.15)
Nov 2014 -2.68∗ (1.35)
Dec 2014 -2.79∗ (1.39)
Constant 21.36∗∗∗ (2.29) 18.66∗∗∗ (2.82) 10.16∗∗ (3.51) 7.26∗∗ (2.23)
Observations 1460 1959 2088 1799
R2 0.92 0.85 0.89 0.95
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B Comparison with ARCEP and OECD Baskets
Table C.1: Mobile services baskets
2011 2012 2013 2014
Voice Data Voice Data Voice Data Voice Data
National Regulator (ARCEP)
Basket 1 421 137 400 236 382 418 480 695
Basket 2 421 27 400 67 382 100 480 179
Basket 3 421 32 400 24 382 37 480 66
Basket 4 84 137 98 236 114 418 123 695
Basket 5 84 27 98 67 114 100 123 179
Basket 6 84 32 98 24 114 37 123 66
Basket 7 24 137 22 236 28 418 33 695
Basket 8 24 27 22 67 28 100 33 179
Basket 9 24 32 22 24 28 37 33 66
OECD
Basket 1 50 100 50 100 50 100 50 100
Basket 2 188 500 188 500 188 500 188 500
Basket 3 569 1000 569 1000 569 1000 569 1000
Basket 4 1787 2000 1787 2000 1787 2000 1787 2000
Basket 5 75 2000 75 2000 75 2000 75 2000
Voice is in minutes, Data in MB
Source: ARCEP website and BEREC Report on mobile broadband prices
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Figure C.1: Price of lowest-cost tariff for ARCEP baskets
Figure C.2: Price of lowest-cost tariff with handset subsidy for ARCEP baskets
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Figure C.3: Price of lowest-cost tariff for OECD baskets
Figure C.4: Price of lowest-cost tariff with handset subsidy for OECD baskets
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